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The Legal Man in the Moon: Exploring Environmental
Personhood for Celestial Bodies
William B. Altabef

Abstract
The rise of the commercial space industry endangers the preservation of environments, such
as the lunar surface and other celestial bodies, with the threat of contamination and resource
exploitation. In the coming decades, flights to space will become commonplace—but at present,
there is no way to hold outer space polluters accountable. The existing international legal regime
is weak, with the United Nations’ space treaties offering limited enforcement mechanisms against
offenders. The increasingly popular concept of environmental personhood offers a solution by
rethinking the meaning of a juridical person within the text of the United Nations Outer Space,
Space Liability, and Moon treaties. Utilizing the International Court of Justice, outer space
environmentalists can seek to recognize celestial bodies as juridical persons and gain third-party
standing to protect the rights of the Moon and seek damages for environmental degradation.
Through the exploration of contentious and advisory avenues within the International Court of
Justice, this Comment advances a new way of thinking to save extraterrestrial environments.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Humanity is on the eve of a new era of industry, during which natural
resources, manufacturing, and research will be conducted beyond terrestrial
boundaries. This will include the mining of asteroids and the transformation or
colonization of untouched celestial bodies for economic gain by human actors. 1
Presently, there is no effective way to enforce environmental regulation on
celestial bodies, leaving them vulnerable to contamination and exploitation
without repercussion.
This is an important issue as the vast mineral riches of outer space could
fundamentally alter Earth’s economy and existing geopolitical rivalries, extending
them to outer space like during the Cold War. While it is unknown when and
where the first human settlement on another celestial body will occur, the rising
number of national and commercial actors interested in achieving such a goal
make it seem probable.2 The success of the multinational effort to maintain a
human population on the International Space Station for nearly two decades
demonstrates the feasibility of this vision.3 Space entrepreneur Jeff Bezos sees the
utilization of space as critical to the resolution of global issues including hunger,
poverty, and pollution.4 These hopes will all be moot if contamination or rapid
exploitation of celestial bodies renders them unable to be used for a greater good.
From a pessimistic perspective, a failure to introduce a regime for regulating the
usage of celestial resources could lead to international conflict in space and on
Earth.5
In order to understand the scope of the problem, Parts A and B of Section
II of this Comment examine the threat posed by the contamination and
exploitation of outer space resources. Part C of Section II discusses how the
current international regime is lacking solutions and is unlikely to create a
legislative solution given the national incentives to develop space industries. Part
1

2

Brian Higginbotham, The Space Economy: An Industry Takes Off, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct.
11, 2018), https://perma.cc/9KCW-7UGN.
Mike Brown, SpaceX Here’s the Timeline for Getting to Mars and Starting a Colony, INVERSE (July 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/JWN5-8JNN; Mars & Beyond: The Road to Making Humanity Multiplanetary,
SPACEX, https://perma.cc/8CCK-7NQG; see also The Space Race is Dominated by New Contenders, THE
ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/J59A-BRWS (detailing the increasing frequency of
Chinese, Indian, and private space launches).

3

Press Release, The European Space Agency, First Crew Starts Living and Working on the
International Space Station, (Oct. 31, 2000), https://perma.cc/YX4Q-9GY4.

4

Soo Youn & Christine Theodorou, Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos Unveils Plans for Space Colonization, ABC
NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/WQ2T-B4Y8.

5

David A. Wemer, Can International Cooperation in Space Survive Geopolitical Competition on Earth?,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/ML99-Y3EA; Stuart Clark, ‘It’s Going to
Happen’: Is the World Ready for War in Space?, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/PRG7-DD43.
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D of Section II frames the Comment’s focus: solving the problem of standing for
international litigation over extraterrestrial environmental damage. Section III Part
A provides a more substantive legal background, first by detailing the relevant
U.N. treaties: the Outer Space Treaty, the Space Liability Convention, and the
Moon Treaty. Section III Part B introduces the legal concept of environmental
personhood, an idea quickly gaining traction as national and local governments
seek to preserve natural resources on Earth and protect against climate change.
Environmental personhood bestows juridical personhood upon natural features,
enabling them to have standing so that other entities or persons can bring claims
on their behalf. Finally, Section IV hypothesizes the application of environmental
personhood in the realm of outer space and how the existing legal framework can
provide a system of regulation and justice for celestial natural resources. The
proposed means of incorporating environmental personhood into the
international law of space would be a judgment by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), either through an advisory opinion or a contentious case. While there
are potential problems and alternative solutions, implementing environmental
personhood through a judicial decision represents a rapid solution requiring
limited consensus to a problem that could quickly grow beyond control.

II. T HE P ROBLEM
The introduction of new national space programs6 and commercial ventures7
has ensured that space will become even more crowded in the coming years.
Activity will not be limited to mere scientific exploration. Already, commercial
actors are planning to mine celestial bodies for profit.8 While the near-term future
for spacefaring consumers appears to be tourism,9 the goal of national space
programs and space entrepreneurs is resource extraction, lunar colonization, and
beyond.10 The Moon is proposed to be an abundant source of Helium-3, a few

6

7
8

9

10

Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, INDIA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/ZP82-LKT5.
See Higginbotham, supra note 1.
Chloe Cornish, Interplanetary Players: A Who’s Who of Space Mining, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://perma.cc/KMR6-KEH3; Jeff Foust, A Trillion-Dollar Space Industry Will Require New
Markets, SPACE NEWS (July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/JG8H-MRCW.
Alex Knapp, With Virgin Galactic’s Latest Flight, Has Space Tourism Finally Arrived?, FORBES (Dec. 14,
2018), https://perma.cc/CJ4T-HLWQ; Jonathan O’Callaghan, 2019 Is the Year That Space Tourism
Finally Becomes a Reality. No, Really, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/WM96-3XTK.
Jackie Wattles, NASA Wants Astronauts to Go Back to the Moon in 2024. Is It Possible?, CNN BUSINESS
(June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/2AC9-BMFM; NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION, AMERICA TO THE MOON BY 2024, NASA’S FY 2020 BUDGET AMENDMENT
SUMMARY, https://perma.cc/9NWL-SSR3; Olivia Solon, Elon Musk: We Must Colonize Mars to
Preserve Our Species in a Third World War, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8W5BBH7T; see Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Brown, supra note 2.
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hundred tons of which could meet Earth’s energy needs for an entire year.11 There
is an incentive in the space mining and colonization industries to build a track
record of success to lure investment in a capital-intensive field, making the nearby
Moon’s energy reserves an appealing target for early commercial missions. The
private space race will potentially create the first trillionaire, leaving little room for
the thought of the environmental effects on faraway places.12
First, this Section discusses the two main environmental threats associated
with new commercial enterprises: exploitation and contamination. Then, this
Section explains how the existing legal framework compounds the practical
problems, leaving a gap for the articulation and measurement of the
environmental harm in the commons of outer space.

A. The Practical Problems
Without actions causing direct harms, there is no need for a legal framework
to regulate activity and hold bad actors accountable. In order to understand the
problem that the legal solution of extraterrestrial environmental personhood is
attempting to solve, first this Comment will introduce the practical problems of
exploitation and contamination.

1. Exploitation
The risk of exploitation is exponentially rising as the prospect of harnessing
resources in outer space becomes commercially viable. Exploitation in this context
can be defined as the extraction and consumption of extraterrestrial resources for
non-scientific purposes, potentially without research on the long-term impact of
such activities. The global space economy currently produces revenues of $350
billion, a number conservatively expected to rise to $1 trillion by 2040. 13
Traditional aerospace companies such as Boeing and Airbus continue to focus
primarily on designing rockets for national program usage.14 Newer entrants such
as Planetary Resources are explicitly focusing on the private exploitation of

11

12

13

14

Niklas Reinke, No Helium-3 from Moon – Commentary on the Current Moon Debate, in DLR COUNTDOWN
#3 25 (2007); see also Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in HANDBOOK OF
SPACE LAW (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
Tiffany Terrell, Physicist Says Asteroid Mining Ventures Will Spawn First Trillionaire, GLOBAL NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/J75M-87NA.
Foust, supra note 8; Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, MORGAN STANLEY (July 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9FUJ-432V.
Andrea Shalal, Airbus Seeks New Partners to Expand in U.S. Space Market, REUTERS (June 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5TMP-XC9Y; see also Joel Kowsky, From Take Off to Landing, NASA and Boeing
Work
Together
to
Launch
Commercial
Crew,
NASA
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/from-take-off-to-landing-nasa-and-boeing-work-together-tolaunch-commercial-crew.
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asteroids through space mining,15 while others, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin,
have taken an ‘all of the above’ approach with broad goals to commercialize space
and support the eventual colonization of outer space.16
Commercial actors may be less likely to concern themselves with
implementing procedures to mitigate or prevent pollution, and they could perform
launch operations from jurisdictions with minimal requirements in order to
maximize profitability.17 Previous missions to space were conducted for scientific
purposes by governments, with American and Soviet space programs
implementing planetary protection precautions for landers to prevent forward
contamination.18 The growing commercial industry raises the potential for a much
more crowded outer space with less commitment to protocol. Already,
commercial space ventures are launching thousands of satellites, endangering the
low Earth orbit ecosystem, with little planning for the safe decommission of these
satellites.19 While sustainable usage and extraction of extraterrestrial resources
would be ideal, the risky nature of the space industry coupled with limited current
enforcement is likely to produce a tragedy of the commons.20

2. Contamination
Human exploration has a long history of contamination, and space is no
exception.21 For the purposes of this Comment, contamination specifically refers
to the introduction of foreign substances and lifeforms into extraterrestrial

15

Redefining Natural Resources: Why Asteroids, PLANETARY RECOURSES, https://perma.cc/363C-ZKKZ.

16

Meghan Bartels, SpaceX Wants to Send People to Mars. Here’s What the Trip Might Look Like., SPACE.COM
(May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Y3P-BYCD; see also Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Erik
Sofge, The Most Innovative Space Companies of 2020, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/X8LS-JAYC.

17

See Caroline Delber, SpaceX Says There Are No Laws on Mars, So Maybe Elon Musk Will Be President,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/338Z-TY6K (discussing SpaceX’s terms
of service which claim Mars is a free planet and that no Earth-based government has authority over
Mars).

18

LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND
CHARTING THE FUTURE 51 (2008).

19

EUROPEAN SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SPACE TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT (2020), https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-public-reports/send/2-public-espireports/494-espi-report-71-stm.
See Jonathan O’Callaghan, The FCC’s Approval of SpaceX’s Starlink Mega Constellation May Have Been
Unlawful, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/GVZ7-J87W (detailing the
launch of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system around the Earth has already begun to brighten the sky,
inhibiting terrestrial stargazing).
See Megan Garber, The Trash We’ve Left on the Moon, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2012),
https://perma.cc/SCC5-YGPL (listing the many items left from the Apollo missions including
human waste). For information about the potential future of contamination, see MARGARET S.
RACE ET AL., NASA, PLANETARY PROTECTION KNOWLEDGE FOR HUMAN EXTRATERRESTRIAL
MISSIONS, WORKSHOP REPORT (2015), https://perma.cc/MF8N-C8GG.

20

21
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environments. Recent events further evidence the risks of contamination in an
unregulated field. In February 2019, a private rocket carrying a lunar lander
crashed on the surface of the Moon.22 The rocket was funded by the American
nonprofit Arch Mission Foundation and was launched from Florida by the Israeli
corporation SpaceIL.23 Unbeknownst to international regulators at the time of
launch, the rocket was carrying thousands of tardigrades, a terrestrial creature
known for its ability to survive nearly anywhere.24 Nova Spivack, the cofounder
of the Arch Mission Foundation, admitted to placing the tardigrades on the
SpaceIL lander at the last minute without disclosing the nature of the addition to
SpaceIL.25 Although there is no definitive analysis of the consequences of
introducing the tardigrades into the lunar environment, they are the only creature
known to survive the vacuum of space.26 There is limited immediate threat posed
by the tardigrades as they exist in a state of cryptobiosis in space, unable to
reproduce with their metabolism held to a minimum, but the concern is that the
next species sent to the Moon might not be as harmless.27
Regardless, the actions of the Arch Mission Foundation violate existing
planetary protection guidelines, practices set out by the international Committee
on Space Research (COSPAR) and national space agencies to prevent cross
contamination between planetary bodies.28 There has been no reported sanction
for the irresponsible private actors involved in the tardigrade launch, signaling a
low risk to subsequent commercial actors and increasing the chance of future
contamination or exploitation. National systems are disincentivized from
22

23

Loren Grush, Why Stowaway Creatures on the Moon Confound International Space Law, THE VERGE (Aug.
16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/16/20804219/moon-tardigrades-lunar-landerspaceil-arch-mission-foundation-outer-space-treaty-law.
Id.

24

Hannah Osborne, Thousands of ‘Indestructible’ Tardigrades Could Be Living on the Moon After Crashing on
the Lunar Surface, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8JDY-G8HU.

25

Chris Taylor, ‘I’m the First Space Pirate!’ How Tardigrades Were Secretly Smuggled to the Moon, MASHABLE
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/98W5-JTVY (noting that Spivack considers himself to be the first
space pirate after his smuggling of the tardigrades).
Joseph Stromberg, How Does the Tiny Waterbear Survive in Outer Space, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Sept.
11, 2012), https://perma.cc/FNF2-74DT; Jason Daley, A Crashed Spacecraft Might Have Put Earth’s
Most Indestructible Organisms on the Moon, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/KR99-TW6Z.
Ari Shapiro, Thousands of Tardigrades are Stranded on the Moon After a Failed Lunar Mission, NPR (Aug.
8, 2019), https://perma.cc/L4GB-J4CD.
COSPAR, The COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection Role, Structure and Activities, 205 SPACE RSCH.
TODAY 14 (Aug. 2019) (providing an overview of the planetary protection framework and examples
of procedures, including the requirement that missions to other planetary bodies “adhere to
stringent planetary protection measures to abide the first rationale for planetary protection to not
interfere with ‘scientific investigations of possible extraterrestrial life forms, precursors, and
remnants’ and not to impose terrestrial biological contamination to these objects of high
astrobiological interest”).

26

27

28
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regulating harshly, as launches can happen across the globe and fledgling space
companies might take their businesses to friendlier jurisdictions.
While the Earth’s atmosphere has proven to be relatively durable in the face
of carbon emissions and other pollutants, the atmospheres of our neighbors are
far more fragile. The emissions of twenty Apollo mission landings would have
effectively doubled the lunar atmosphere; the Martian atmosphere is similarly
tenuous.29 When imagining the scale of a lunar mining operation or colony, it is
easy to predict the potential human-caused climate change on the lunar surface.
Introducing enough biological or chemical contaminants could produce carbon
emissions that start a dangerous process.
Various actors have proposed larger environmental offenses, particularly
terraforming, the process by which an Earthlike ecosystem is created on another
planet. Already, small steps have been taken to test our ability to bring Earth to
other surfaces, such as when China attempted to grow cotton on the Moon.30
There is concern that an effort to terraform will damage the natural ecosystem of
the targeted planet. Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, has suggested terraforming Mars
and potentially nuking ice deposits on its surface.31 Musk’s plan to bring life to
Mars through terraforming has numerous critics and doubters in the scientific
community, particularly astrobiologists.32 It could be that nuking Mars leads to the
degradation of natural features that humanity might wish to preserve for future
generations. Just as Americans have protected Yosemite and the Grand Canyon,
perhaps future Martian settlers will wish that Olympus Mons had been protected.
Some amount of extraterrestrial resource usage is permissible to satisfy
human needs for research and scientific gains, but there should be a
contamination threshold beyond which there is some sort of legal ramification.
The contamination threshold could be determined by considering the value of the
contaminated body and the severity of the contamination. The value of the
extraterrestrial body can be governed by the categories of planetary protection
priority already established by COSPAR based upon the probability that those
bodies have life on them.33 For example, the contamination threshold might be
29

See Manfred Hintz, Environmental Aspects of Settlements on the Moon and Mars Planetary Protection, 34
PROC. L. OUTER SPACE 59, 60 (1991).

30

Amy Held, China Tried to Grow Cotton on the Moon, but It Didn’t Work, NPR (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R67A-BF2N.

31

Doyle Rice, NASA Says We Can’t Terraform Mars. Elon Musk Disagrees, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://perma.cc/PB84-3THS; see also Sissi Cao, Elon Musk Wants to ‘Nuke Mars’ for Humans to
Live—But There is One Problem, OBSERVER (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/VSJ7-9NL6.
See, e.g., Lucianne Walkowicz, The Problem with Terraforming Mars: What Do We Lose If We Make the Red
Planet Hospitable to Humans?, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/HM3Y-LV5R; Bruce M.
Jakosky & Christopher S. Edwards, Inventory of CO2 available for terraforming Mars, 2 NATURE
ASTRONOMY 634 (2018).
See COSPAR, supra note 28.

32

33
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higher for a barren asteroid and lower for Europa, which is believed to have a
subsurface ocean. There would be variation by the type of contaminant and the
amount of exposure. Leaving sealed bags of human waste on the Moon from the
Apollo missions might not be as harmful as releasing a school of fish into an
extraterrestrial ocean.

B. The Legal Problems
The potential damage from exploitation and contamination could be
mitigated if there was a sufficient regulatory regime or enforcement mechanism
to curb the activities of future polluters. As outlined below, the current national
and international regulatory regimes fail to control independent actors seeking a
profit. Although it may be possible to craft regulations capable of protecting
extraterrestrial environments through permitting and planetary protection
systems, political capital requirements and national incentives make regulation a
less likely solution. Instead, a few environmentally conscious actors can seek
judgments through international litigation, lowering the potential political costs
and providing a more immediate solution than the drafting of regulations. The
issue that this Comment focuses on is how to cure potential defects in standing
and causation in potential international litigation over environmental damage to
an extraterrestrial environment, such as the Moon.

1. Lacking Regulatory Regime
Despite decades of increasing usage and dependency on outer space as a
resource, the international regime governing outer space is weak. The United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spaces (COPUOS) oversees
the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and created the
five current U.N. treaties covering outer space.34 While the first space treaty from
1967 has 109 states parties,35 subsequent treaties offering more specific regulation
of space received much less support, with the Moon Treaty having only 18 states
parties.36 The five main space treaties were all introduced between 1967 and 1979,
with no substantive development of an international regulatory regime in the
subsequent years. This gap in regulation has increased along with the possibilities
and realities of human use of space.
Many nations have supplemented the international agreements with their
own space regulations. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration
34
35

36

Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, https://perma.cc/536N-7FQU.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5,
1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
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oversees the space launch licensing process,37 and maritime jurisdiction extends to
spaceships.38 In the European Union,39 Norway,40 Sweden,41 Belgium,42 the
Netherlands,43 and France44 have all passed laws to regulate private space
enterprises. These laws, among many other examples at the national level, often
require private actors to secure permission or comply with a national registry
before launching objects into space. While these national regulations impose some
restrictions on commercial actors, the international regime never reached a
sufficient level of development to do so.
The development of independent national laws is not necessarily beneficial
to the protection of celestial environments. Given the vast amount of resources
and money at stake, it may be more likely that national legislation leads to a race
to the bottom to enable domestic space corporations to engage in riskier but more
profitable activities than their international competitors.45 Increasing values of
asteroid minerals in combination with lower barriers to entry as space technology
improves will encourage more commercial players to enter the industry. Without
an international regulatory regime in place, commercial actors will be incentivized
to lobby against regulations as revenues increase and they gain more influence
within national governments. National governments will also have limited
incentives to regulate their own space industries if it will hurt their competitiveness
in the broader market. Even if national governments were willing to create and
enforce a working environmental system, the lack of uniformity between national
standards still calls for an international approach.
Seabed mining provides a terrestrial example of this problem. After initial
proposals to collect minerals from the sea floor developed in the 1960s,46 the U.N.

37

Licensing Process, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE
TRANSPORTATION, https://perma.cc/RU2Z-W6Q2.

38

18 U.S.C. § 7(6).
Frans von der Dunk, The Legal Framework for Space Projects in Europe: Aspects of Applicable Law and
Dispute Resolution, in CONTRACTING FOR SPACE: CONTRACT PRACTICE IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE
SECTOR 357 (Lesley Jane Smith & Ingo Baumann eds., 2011).

39

OF

COMMERCIAL SPACE

40

Lov om oppskyting av gjenstander fra norsk territorium m.m. ut i verdensrommet, 13 juni 1969 nr.
38 (Nor.).

41

2 § LAG OM RYMDVERKSAMHET, (Svensk f-författningssamling [SFS] 1982:963) (Swed.).
Loi relative aux activités de lancement, d’opération de vol ou de guidage d'objets spatiaux of Sept.17,
2005, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Nov.4, 2008 (Belg.).
Wet rimtevaartactiviteiten, 24 januari 2007, Stb. 2007, 80 (Neth.).

42

43
44

Loi 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 4, 2008, p. 9169 (Fr.).

45

See Tronchetti, supra note 11, at 810.
Julie Hunter, Pradeep Singh & Julian Aguon, Broadening Common Heritages, Addressing Gaps in the Deep
Sea Mining Regulatory Regime, HARV. ENV’T L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6XE8K3H.

46
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enacted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in
1982.47 UNCLOS established an international framework for several international
maritime legal issues, including the establishment of the International Seabed
Authority (ISA) under Part XI of the convention. Article 136 declares, “The
[seabed] Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.”48 The
‘common heritage of mankind’ language mirrors language that was used to
describe the Moon in the Moon Treaty, which was being drafted
contemporaneously.49 The result of UNCLOS and the ISA has been far from
ideal. The ISA has operated with limited transparency,50 giving out twenty-seven
contracts for the mining of 1.4 million square kilometers with limited assurances
of the environmental controls desired by some conservationists.51 A small number
of contracts for mining in international waters come from closed sessions of the
ISA, while many larger contracts are given by national governments to mine the
seabed within their exclusive economic zones with limited research on the
ultimate environmental impact.52 The U.S. notably objected to parts of UNCLOS,
undermining its effectiveness and leading to competing national regulatory
systems.53 It is not unreasonable to imagine the same dual licensing system taking
hold in space, whereby some corporations are licensed by national launch
authorities and others by an international body. The danger is much the same, that
corporations will seek the nations willing to give early licenses in order to get ahead
in space.
The interaction of actors incentivized to be the first to make a large profit in
a risky industry with the lack of real regulation may lead to the contamination or
exploitation of celestial resources with potentially irreversible consequences. A
historical analogy would be that of the older oil wells in Texas, drilled without
long-term concern for environmental impact, which are now leaking
contaminants across the state.54 When starting a risky natural resources venture,
47
48
49

50

51

52
53

54

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
Id. art. 136.
See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Dark Side of The Moon: The Status of the Moon: Public Concepts and Private
Enterprise, 40 PROC. L. OUTER SPACE 119, 121–22 (1997) (discussing the application of the
“common heritage of mankind” principle to the Moon).
Kirsten F. Thompson et al., Seabed Mining and Approaches to Governance of the Deep Seabed, FRONTIERS
MARINE SCIENCE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8BGH-C78E,
Kathryn A. Miller et al., An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development,
Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps, FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCIENCE (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://perma.cc/P963-2GKQ.
Id. (detailing contracts given to mine off the coast of Africa and Oceania).
See James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea after UNCLOS III, 46 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 30 (1983) and Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of
the Sea Convention, THE DIPLOMAT (May 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/V66U-GE68.
Jim Malewitz, Abandoned Texas Oil Wells Seen as “Ticking Time Bombs” of Contamination, TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/6EW2-UGQM.
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the first goal is to make a substantial return, and the fear of environmental liability
is often an afterthought. If a wildcatter does not find oil or cannot get it out of
the ground, they will be just as insolvent as if they were hit with large amounts of
environmental liability. Additionally, there is a short-term bias to conducting many
ventures as the environmental impact and full consequences often are not
calculable until decades later, potentially long after the initial mining venture has
concluded.55 History cautions against the lack of regulation. A legal regime is
needed to hold offending actors accountable in a time horizon short enough to
create an incentivizing impact.

2. Unarticulated Basis for International Litigation
In the absence of either a working international regulatory framework or
comparable national systems, pursuing environmental damages claims under the
existing U.N. space treaties in the ICJ presents a viable path to create
accountability and promote extraterrestrial conservation. The language of the
treaties, detailed in the following Section, enables a nation to seek monetary
damages when space debris from a second nation strikes the territory or property
of the first nation. In the extraterrestrial context, the difficulty arises when the
damage occurs to another planetary body, which no nation has a territorial claim
to protect. There is a gap in the current practice and scholarship on international
law to show how a litigant could have standing to sue for damage to extraterrestrial
environments, such as that of the Moon. This Comment will focus on answering
this problem by using the legal concept of environmental personhood to articulate
what is damaged when the Moon is polluted and how third-party standing will
hold bad actors accountable.

III. L EGAL B ACKGROUND
A. Existing International Law for Celestial Bodies
The U.N. is the primary governing authority on international laws and
regulations pertaining to outer space. Through the U.N. Office for Outer Space
Affairs, the U.N. tracks satellites orbiting the Earth and works to implement the
five adopted space treaties. The two treaties most relevant to this Comment are
the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty laid out an
initial framework for international ambitions to regulate outer space activity, but
it left gaps and ambiguities for subsequent treaties and regulations to fill in or
refine. The Outer Space Treaty’s general spirit provides a lodestar for subsequent
laws to follow. The Space Liability Convention, for example, built upon the Outer
Space Treaty to create a mechanism for nations to seek damages when debris fall
into their sovereign territory, an important building block for nations seeking to
55

Id.
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protect extraterrestrial environments from contamination or exploitation. Finally,
the Moon Treaty introduced additional protections for the Moon and represented
the most progressive attempt to prevent exploitative usage of extraterrestrial
resources.
While the Moon Treaty was less widely adopted, the Outer Space Treaty and
Space Liability Convention can work in concert to provide a path for a case to be
heard in the ICJ if the court were to adopt an environmental personhood reading
of certain provisions of the treaties. The Moon Treaty still provides a persuasive
example of where the international legal community might have gone had
competitive intentions been removed.

1. The Outer Space Treaty
The Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer
Space Treaty) was the first attempt to establish an international regime for outer
space, ratified just 10 years after Sputnik and two years before the Apollo 11
landing.56 It has been ratified by 110 parties, including all major spacefaring
nations, and serves as the most widely adopted source of international space law.
Certain sections were later clarified by subsequent agreements such as the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space.57
The preamble of the Outer Space Treaty recognizes “the common interest
of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes.”58 This language demonstrates the reliance on historic
conceptions of nature serving human needs, an idea that will be countered by the
concept of environmental personhood and subsequent U.N. treaty language. In
the absence of any foundational law for outer space, it may have seemed natural
to transplant the legal regime that governed the property of Earth to outer space.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes the broad jurisdiction of the
treaty as “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”59 Article
II declares “[o]uter space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”60 However, some commentators have

56

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.
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Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue
Agreement].
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.

58
59
60

Id. art. I.
Id. art. II.
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speculated whether resources are similarly unclaimable once they have been
extracted. 61
Under Article IX, “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer
space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration
of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination . . . .”62 The introduction of
tardigrades is clearly a form of contamination, but the harm caused by their
introduction is still unknown. Previous ventures to the Moon during the Apollo
missions left bags of human waste, which some scientists have hypothesized could
have introduced microbial life to the previously sterile lunar surface.63
Terraforming a planet would almost certainly be a harmful contamination as it
would purposefully change the ecosystem of a planet. The harm would be to the
natural planet itself, rather than to the human interests that are traditionally at the
core of human-centric Anglo-American property law. The environmental
personhood concept requires that the protection from harm given to the celestial
body be the same protection the law would give any human body. Even using the
most stringent and narrow definitions of harm, requiring potentially irreversible
decimation of any native lifeforms and the introduction of invasive species from
Earth as proposed by terraforming advocates would meet these criteria. Yet, the
current international framework has limited means to punish violations of this
treaty.

2. The Space Liability Convention
Following the Outer Space Treaty, the U.N. enacted the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Space Liability
Convention) in 1972.64 The Space Liability Convention clarified language
regarding the consequences of damages derived from space travel. While the focus
of the treaty appears to be on compensation for damages stemming from an object
falling from space, much of the treaty is still operable for “damage being caused
elsewhere than on the surface of the earth.”65 Under Article I, damages can occur
to “persons, natural or juridical . . . .”66 The inclusion of juridical persons does not
appear to be limited to persons who are a citizen of a state party. Rather the injury
of any juridical person could be sufficient for a claim should the litigant have
standing, enabling monetary damages for harm to juridical persons under the
61

62

See Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 359, 366,
370 (1994).
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX.
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Andrew C. Schuerger, John E. Moores, David J. Smith & Günther Reitz, A Lunar Microbial Survival
Model for Predicting the Forward Contamination of the Moon, 19 ASTROBIOLOGY 730, 752 (2019).
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Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention].
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environmental personhood model. Liability extends to “a State from whose
territory or facility a space object is launched.”67 Thus, had the SpaceIL rocket
caused damage, the U.S. would be the liable nation as the rocket was initially
launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.68
The Space Liability Convention suggests that diplomatic negotiations should
be the primary means of settling damages claims. After stating a claim, a party
“may also present its claim to the Secretary-General of the United Nations” under
Article IX.69 Articles XIV–XX outline the use of an international Commission to
resolve disputes between the parties when negotiations fail. The Commission is
listed as the tertiary option, less preferable to negotiation or the assistance of the
Secretary-General. There has only been one resolution of a claim thus far under
the Space Liability Convention. In 1978, a Soviet nuclear satellite scattered
radioactive debris over Canada, leading Canada to claim several million dollars in
damages under the Space Liability Convention.70 The claim was then settled
through diplomatic means before the point at which the Secretary-General would
have made a recommendation. While this system worked for a state-sponsored
satellite,71 it has tremendous shortcomings in dealing with the coming private
space industry. In particular, the Space Liability Convention ostensibly requires
the claims of private parties to be sponsored by a state party to the treaty.72
Although not discussed in the text of the Space Liability Convention, the
consultation of the ICJ appears to be a possible avenue under a recommendation
by the Secretary-General. With no precedent demonstrating the mechanics of the
Space Liability Convention at a more contentious or substantive procedural point,
the Secretary-General would likely look to proven dispute resolution mechanisms.
The ICJ would be at the top of the list given its proven record of equitable
arbitration,73 statutory status under the U.N.,74 and reputation as the premier
international court. Demonstrating its institutional capacity, the ICJ has decided
claims over other extraterritorial areas, including a claim over whaling in Antarctic

67

Id. art. I(c)(ii).

68

See Grush, supra note 22; Osborne, supra note 24.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX
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Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954”, Can.-U.S.S.R.,
1981 Can. T.S. No. 8, art. 2 [hereinafter Claims Protocol].
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‘State-sponsored’ here describes space missions funded or executed by nation states rather than
activities done for private profit without the inducement of a national government.
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See Dan St. John, Comment, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 40
DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 686, 696 (2012).
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Cases, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/CZ5G-CHWK (“Between 22 May
1947 and 11 November 2019, 178 cases were entered in the General List.”).
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, April 18, 1946, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
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water under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. 75
Hearing a case under the Space Liability Convention could become a routine
practice for the ICJ in the coming decades as space traffic increases. An
environmental personhood claim might eventually be heard as the ICJ produces
substantially more precedent proving institutional expertise in extraterrestrial legal
matters.

3. The Moon Treaty
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty)76 was the final of the five U.N. space treaties. Since
its introduction in 1979, the Moon Treaty has been significantly less adopted than
the Outer Space Treaty, with only 18 states parties. While the Moon Treaty is the
most progressive on environmental issues, the lack of widespread adoption
“renders the instrument practically meaningless.”77 India is the only Moon Treaty
signatory to also have a significant national space program thus far.78 France is an
original signatory to the Moon Treaty and is also a member state of the European
Space Agency, potentially tying one of the largest space agencies to the Moon
Treaty through a key member. Other nations continue to slowly join the Moon
Treaty with accessions by Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2012, Venezuela in 2016,
and Armenia in 2018. The slow pace of adoption has left a “vacuum” of
international law over the Moon,79 but the Moon Treaty still serves an important
role as the best expression of the international objectives for a legal framework to
govern the Moon.
The Moon Treaty’s status as the only treaty explicitly about the Moon should
still guide behavior and inform any future discussions over the law governing the
Moon. Most of the opposition to the Moon Treaty by the spacefaring powers at
the time, the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was based upon
reaction to the potential requirement to share extracted mineral wealth with other
nations.80 This Comment does not address the legality of lunar mining itself,
instead focusing on the legal ramifications for the environmental impact of such
activities. The Outer Space Treaty set principles broadly for outer space activity;

75

Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 148
(Mar. 14).
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Moon Treaty, supra note 36.
Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, 717, 726 (Frans
von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, supra note 6.
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Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, THE SPACE
REVIEW (Oct. 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/K6JA-GJ43.
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See David Everett Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty
and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RES. & ENV’T L. 293, 302–06, 311–13 (1992).
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whereas subsequent treaties, such as the Moon Treaty, sought to fill in the gaps.81
The Space Liability Convention created the deeper legal framework initially called
for in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty covering liability for space activities.
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space82 built out the vision set forth in
Article V of the Outer Space Treaty. So, while the Moon Treaty received fewer
initial ratifications, it can serve as an explanatory document for the framework that
the signatories of the Outer Space Treaty had envisioned.
Article 1 of the Moon Treaty states that the treaty applies to the Moon and
also “to other celestial bodies within the solar system other than the earth.”83 The
Moon Treaty recognizes that outer space law is not separate from the international
law framework but rather a subset of it, as “[a]ll activities on the moon, including
its exploration and use, shall be carried out in accordance with international law,
in particular the Charter of the United Nations . . . .”84 Under this conception, the
broader international legal mechanisms, such as the ICJ and the Security Council,
still govern the operations of space actors.
Later sections of the Moon Treaty deal more directly with the importance of
environmental preservation. Article 7 § 1 states that “[i]n exploring and using the
[M]oon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing
balance of its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that
environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extraenvironmental matter or otherwise.”85 This represents a more specific and
stronger version of the language seen in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty of
1967. The examples of terraforming and the introduction of tardigrades would
likely be considered violations of this language. Under Article 11 § 1, “[t]he moon
and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind . . . .”86 Unlike the
“province of all mankind” language from the Outer Space Treaty, the phrase
“common heritage of mankind” is stronger and points to the Moon’s unique

81

82
83
84
85
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Each of the preambles to the various space treaties refers to the prior agreements and the spirit of
law the new treaty seeks to build upon. See Moon Treaty, supra note 35, ¶ 15 (“Recalling the Treaty
on the Principles Governing the Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spaces including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in to Outer Space, the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space . . . .”).
Rescue Agreement, supra note 57.
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art 7.
Id. art. 11 § 1.
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freedom from ownership.87 This language reinforces the human-centric attitude
toward natural resources, but also indicates a common interest in the regulation
or sustainable usage of the Moon. By recognizing a common heritage value of the
Moon to all humans, the Moon Treaty might create an avenue for a plaintiff to
bring a claim for the degradation of the lunar environment. The common heritage
aspect of the Moon can enable third parties to serve as guardian ad litem for the
environmental person that is the Moon.
Article 11 § 3 states that “[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the
[M]oon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property
of any State . . . or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”88 Based on
this language, it seems that there should be no ownership or territorial claims to
the Moon, creating a situation analogous to Antarctica.89 Additionally, it would be
hard to legally extract and sell material from the Moon if it cannot be owned.
Prohibiting ownership may prevent transfer or encourage actors to adopt a parallel
system more supportive of their commercial needs.
Article 11 § 5 requires that “States Parties to this Agreement hereby
undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures,
to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such
exploitation is about to become feasible.”90 Article 11 § 7 states that “[t]he main
purposes of the international regime to be established shall include: (a) The orderly
and safe development of the natural resources of the Moon; (b) The rational
management of those resources; (c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of
those resources . . . .”91 It is conceivable that these responsibilities could be
delegated to UNOOSA or COPUOS, but no regime or delegation of authority
exists yet to carry out the Moon Treaty’s vision. Article 15 §§ 2–3 set out methods
for resolving disputes, including consultation with the offending nation, the
assistance of the Secretary-General, or “other peaceful means of [the states
parties’] choice appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of the dispute.”92

4. Interpreting the U.N. Treaties
While the U.N. outer space treaties provide a legal framework, judicial
interpretation of the treaties’ terms can enable greater reach and regulation. In the
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See Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer
Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 410 (2004).
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 3.
Juan Francisco Salazar, Antarctica and Outer Space: Relational Trajectories, 7 POLAR J. 259, 261 (2017)
(detailing how the Antarctic Treaty System and Outer Space Treaties both created “extraterritorial
zones” in which no nation could claim sovereign territory).
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 5.
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common law tradition, judges have the power to fill in the gaps of statutes and
choose the rules that fulfill the enactor’s intent.93 While the U.N. treaties do not
define “juridical person,” the growing adoption of environmental personhood can
fill a gap in the law by providing a legal mechanism for the environmental
regulation envisioned by the treaties. Currently, commercial and national actors
engage in environmentally hazardous behavior with limited fear of international
sanction or economic penalty. Recognition of celestial bodies as juridical persons
will create a more sustainable and just future for humanity in space.

B. Environmental Personhood
1. Introducing the Concept
Protecting nature from exploitation is not a new legal problem: numerous
international agreements have sought to promote the conservation of the Earth’s
resources,94 atmosphere,95 and environments.96 Treaties are often drafted with
exceptions that later become problematic or offer nations the opportunity to
reject specific provisions. Without standing, nature and the organizations seeking
to protect it have no basis to seek remedy from those profiting from
contamination and exploitation. The concept of “environmental personhood”
presents a legal means for the preservation and regulation of natural resources and
can be extended to the outer space context.
Environmental personhood was first introduced by Professor Christopher
D. Stone in a law review article advocating a reconsideration of humanity’s
relationship with nature.97 Stone’s idea gained initial prominence when it was cited
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in his dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton.98 In Morton, the plaintiffs could not seek judicial review. They lacked
standing because the injury identified was to the natural environment and not to
the individuals themselves. Justice Douglas’s dissent drew analogies to other
juridical personhoods such as ships and corporations to illustrate that
93

See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 87 (1984) (discussing the interpretive modes judges use to fill gaps in statutes).
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Agreement System, 23 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 980 (2013) (finding over 747 international
environmental agreements since 1857).
See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12,
2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter The London Convention].
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environmental personhood could create a better sense of justice on behalf of a
harmed ecosystem.99
Stone subsequently expanded upon his initial article in a book of the same
name, detailing the inspiration for his idea and the challenges he foresaw.100 Stone
noted that “[t]hroughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some
new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable,” citing the extension of the
franchise and other protections to women and African Americans.101 In order to
ensure the protection of an environmental person, a court would need to appoint
a guardian ad litem or a representative as courts do in cases involving incompetent
parties.102 The expansion of corporate rights is in many ways a precursor to the
current growth of the environmental personhood movement,103 and subsequent
proponents of expanding rights to non-natural persons have followed this
model.104

2. Subsequent International Adoption
In the years since Stone introduced his theory, there has been significant
discussion of the environmental personhood concept within academic circles,
with over 1500 articles citing his original journal article alone. Beyond academic
momentum,105 various national and local governments have adopted forms of
environmental personhood, either through legislative or judicial avenues. Around
the world, there is a growing movement to preserve and secure the rights of
nature. 106
Ecuador and Bolivia are the strongest adopters, implementing national
environmental safeguards through juridical personhood. Ecuador adopted a
constitutional amendment in 2008 to give nature the right to “exist, persist,
maintain, and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions, and its processes in
evolution.”107 Further, everyone in Ecuador has the right to sue on behalf of the
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environment.108 The principles of environmental personhood enshrined in their
constitution have been upheld in Ecuadorian court, with the Provisional Court of
Loja granting an injunction against the construction of a road and ordering the
remediation of the Vilcabamba River in a 2011 decision.109 The initial claim was
brought by two natural persons on behalf of the environment, demonstrating the
feasibility of environmental personhood claims in court.
Along similar lines, Bolivia introduced legislation granting “Mother Earth”
rights equal to those of natural persons in 2010 and 2012.110 Bolivia authorized the
creation of governmental agencies to litigate on behalf of the earth and oversee
climate change related policies. These laws, like Ecuador’s, promote the right-tolife for natural ecosystems and enable litigation on behalf of nature.
The U.S. and New Zealand have used a more limited approach, granting
juridical personhood to specific environmental features, rather than to the entire
environment. Within the U.S., the most notable effort to introduce environmental
personhood was the Lake Erie Bill of Rights passed by a ballot measure in the
City of Toledo, Ohio.111 The ballot measure gave Lake Erie the right to “exist,
flourish, and evolve naturally” and empowered citizens to sue on behalf of the
lake to enforce those rights against polluters.112 However, this measure was later
nullified by the Ohio General Assembly in a provision added to an annual
budget.113 The law stated that “[n]ature or any ecosystem does not have standing
to participate in or bring an action in any court of common pleas” and “[n]o
person, on behalf of or representing nature or an ecosystem, shall bring an action
in any court of common pleas.”114 Additionally, a U.S. district court later found
the Lake Erie Bill of Rights to be unconstitutionally vague and exceeding the

108
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110
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power of a municipal government in Ohio.115 Although this effort to introduce
environmental personhood was thwarted, the fact that it passed democratically
shows the growing appetite for such legal solutions in the U.S. A number of local
ordinance proposals across the U.S. indicate interest among local environmental
activists.116 New Zealand passed legislation granting environmental personhood
to the Urewera Forest117 and the Whangangui River.118 The protection of the river
is grounded in recognizing it as an ancestor of the Māori people. A representative
of the Crown and a representative of the Whanganui iwi act as protectors of the
river and its rights, giving them standing much like Justice Douglas envisioned.
Just days after the New Zealand parliament granted rights to the
Whangangui River, a judicial ruling in India’s Uttarakand High Court extended
similar protections to the Ganges River.119 The court appointed two state officials
to serve as guardians of the river and its rights. This represents an interpretation
closer to the aim of this Comment: rather than granting new rights, the Indian
high court recognized the existing importance of nature and, thus, expanded legal
standing.
In 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia reached a result similar to
that of the Indian court, declaring that the “Atrato River basin possesses rights to
‘protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration.’”120 This decision created
a joint guardianship between a representative of the government and a member
the indigenous peoples living in the river basin. Following the Constitutional
Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia recognized the
Colombian portion of the Amazon river as a “subject of rights.”121 Colombia’s
115
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decisions represent a model for a high court adjudicating a claim involving
environmental personhood.
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued an even broader decision,
granting legal rights to all of Bangladesh’s rivers to protect them from pollution
and dredging.122 The Bangladeshi court appointed the National River
Conservation Commission, a government agency, to serve as the legal guardian of
the rivers and thus bring suits on the river’s behalf.
As can be expected from their extremely strong stances on granting the
environment juridical standing within their own borders, Ecuador and Bolivia lead
the way in advocating for international adoption of the environmental
personhood model. During a 2010 conference in Bolivia, the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Nature was drafted with the intention of creating a
new international treaty similar to the laws found locally in Bolivia.123 Similarly,
Ecuador has supported the concept of an International Rights of Nature
tribunal.124 Neither of these ideas have gained substantial traction within the
international governmental community, but there has been support from
environmentalist organizations.125
The legal background for this Comment is bifurcated. Currently, the
international treaty regime fails to substantially address what appears to be an
imminent problem, creating a grim outlook for extraterrestrial environments. In
contrast, the potential solution for extraterrestrial environmental protection
appears to be taking off on Earth. The next section hypothesizes the fusion of
these two realities.

IV. R ECOGNIZING E NVIRONMENTAL P ERSONHOOD FOR
C ELESTIAL B ODIES AS A S OLUTION
Judicial application of the environmental personhood concept to the outer
space context can create an effective regulatory regime by utilizing the existing
treaty framework. Enacting large scale international legislation instituting
environmental personhood is unlikely as support for even the Moon Treaty has
been limited and corporate interests would likely oppose potential liability.
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Instead, environmentalists should pursue the judge-led expansion of rights for
celestial bodies through legal action. Although the application to outer space
might be new, the use of courts and judgments to enumerate and enforce rights
is a proven tactic.
Utilizing the Outer Space Treaty and the Space Liability Convention, to
which all major spacefaring nations are parties, can create a swift and clear result
in favor of the environmental rights of celestial bodies. Through the texts of these
two treaties, a case can be made that the ability to bring claims on behalf of
celestial bodies already exists––it merely needs to be articulated by a judge.
Section A below explains the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the current treaties
and environmental claims. Section B explores how a hypothetical plaintiff could
have third-party standing in a contentious claim, with the ICJ either explicitly
interpreting the term “juridical person” to include environmental person or using
a common law approach to apply environmental personhood. Section C discusses
the potential appeal for the ICJ to avoid a contentious decision that could be
rejected by a defendant and instead issue an advisory opinion at the request of a
specialized U.N. agency. The contentious claim is more binding but has less
viability when compared to an advisory opinion. Subsections B and C will discuss
their possibility of success weighed against their relative strengths. Section D
explores the shortcomings of the ICJ adopting environmental personhood, and
Section E discusses alternative solutions and their appeal.
Once environmental personhood for outer space bodies is implemented,
there will be a deterrent effect of liability for actors that fail to prevent
contamination through sufficient planetary protection protocols. A commercial
space venture might implement better precautions if it believes precautions are a
good investment to prevent or reduce potential liability. As a secondary benefit,
the ICJ could order remediation efforts or funds as well, but once a contamination
occurs it is hard to stop as we have seen with invasive species on Earth. Similarly,
the value gained by exploiting space resources and diminishing the common
heritage of mankind must be weighed against a potential judgment.

A. Jurisdiction of t he International Court of Justice
Under the U.N. Charter, the ICJ has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions
and hear contentious cases.126 Members of the U.N. are automatically subject to
the authority of the ICJ, so it cannot be avoided the same way that so many nations
have simply failed to ratify the Moon Treaty. Presently, 74 countries have accepted
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, including Japan, Canada, and many members
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of the European Space Agency.127 In recent years, the ICJ has heard contentious
cases involving environmental claims, including a 2008 claim by Ecuador against
Colombia for the aerial spraying of herbicides128 and a claim by Argentina against
Uruguay for the contamination of the Uruguay River.129 Although both of those
claims were eventually withdrawn, they demonstrate the initial willingness of the
ICJ to adjudicate and potentially assess the compensatory damages for
environmental claims. In February 2018, the ICJ decided its first case involving
environmental injury, holding that Nicaragua had to compensate Costa Rica for
damages to the ecology along the border of the two nations.130 What is new to the
court is not the idea of environmental claims, but rather the setting and idea of
third-party standing on behalf of the environment.

B. Bringing a Contentious Claim
There is a growing belief that the ICJ can hear and settle disputes involving
space law.131 The logic under the current regime is as follows: if disputes arising
under the Outer Space Treaty fail to be resolved through diplomatic channels,
then resolution must come from “international law, including the Charter of the
U.N., in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding.”132 Article 33 of the
U.N. Charter directs disputes between nations to be referred to the ICJ, granting
the court jurisdiction over unsettled space claims.133 The Space Liability
Convention also holds nations responsible for the actions of private parties
launching from within their borders. The International Law Association drafted a
proposed “Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Disputes” in 1984 before
revising the language and formally adopting the text in 1998. The drafted
Convention states a preference for a proposed International Tribunal of Space
Law but provides for adjudication by the ICJ as the next alternative means of
dispute resolution.134 This demonstrates a broader sentiment in the international
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legal profession that the ICJ has the institutional competence to handle such a
case.
The most important part of the case would not necessarily be the merits of
the claim, but the underpinning of the plaintiff’s standing. Examination of these
processes shows the path toward environmental personhood for celestial bodies.
The grounds for a contentious case could be based upon violations of the Outer
Space Treaty, particularly the aforementioned language in Article IX directing
parties to conduct their exploration and studies of celestial bodies while avoiding
harmful contamination. Introducing tardigrades to the surface of the Moon could
have negative consequences, as could plans to mine the lunar ice; a plaintiff would
need to sue an actor causing some substantial effect of environmental degradation.
If a private actor such as SpaceIL or the Arch Mission Foundation did
contaminate the lunar environment and substantial environmental damage were
subsequently proven, the U.S. would be the nation liable under the Space Liability
Convention.

1. Bringing the Claim
A plaintiff-nation such as Ecuador could bring a contentious claim against
the U.S. or Israel for their negligence in regulating their space industries and
allowing the contamination of the lunar surface with tardigrades. The plaintiffnation would need to sue the home country of any private actor rather than that
actor themselves since the ICJ would not have jurisdiction over non-state parties.
The defendant-nation could then seek to collect judgment from the private party
responsible for the environmental damage. Ecuador could claim that it has
standing based on the violation of the Outer Space Treaty through environmental
personhood of the Moon and seek judicial interpretation by the ICJ of the relevant
space treaties.
The Outer Space Treaty’s terminology prohibiting “adverse changes in the
environment” and “harmful contamination” are largely undefined.135 The ICJ
could conclude that exploitation or contamination of the lunar environment is a
violation of the Outer Space Treaty. This presents a relatively straightforward way
for a nation like Ecuador to bring a claim against offending nations. In order to
seek damages though, it would be more useful to receive a ruling granting thirdparty standing.

2. Deciding a Case Explicitly Under Environmental Personhood
The Statute of the International Court of Justice includes sections
determining the competence of the court and guiding the decision-making
process.136 Under Article 38, the ICJ is to apply law based on international
135
136
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convention, international custom, “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations,” and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations.”137 Utilizing this jurisprudential
guidance, the ICJ could find that the international momentum is shifting towards
recognizing environmental personhood as an increasingly accepted legal principle.
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty makes all public international law applicable
to space activities, so an international customary law of environmental
personhood could be thought of as operating in the background of the Outer
Space Treaty. The court would not have to reach far to see the many recent
examples of high courts adopting the principle of environmental personhood and
implement it in the international field of space law. Under this logic, the ICJ could
recognize the Moon as a juridical person under the text of the Outer Space Treaty
and enable other parties, such as Ecuador, to bring a claim on its behalf when the
treaty has been violated.
Beyond the Outer Space Treaty, the ICJ could look to the Moon Treaty as
the starting point for discussions regarding the laws governing the Moon.138
Despite its limited adoption, the Moon Treaty serves as the best articulation of
international law for the Moon and could be used as an explanatory companion
of the Outer Space Treaty as discussed previously. The language of the Moon
Treaty was the product of an extensive drafting process by the U.N., including the
American and Soviet edits that were implemented.139 While those nations
ultimately declined to ratify the Moon Treaty as an objection to specific language,
it still serves as the best demonstration of international intention in this area. In
the same way that New Zealand explained its implementation of environmental
personhood as recognition of the ancestry of the Māori people,140 the ICJ could
utilize the language of the Moon Treaty, which states that the Moon is part of the
“common heritage of all mankind.”141 Enabling claims by third parties brought on
behalf of the Moon validates the language of the Moon Treaty, with the New
Zealand implementation as precedent.

3. Deciding a Case Using a Common Law Approach
Beyond the argument that environmental personhood is becoming an
accepted principle, the judges could also be motivated by the even broader idea
that the creation of common law principles can be a form of regulation. Professor
137
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Fabio Tronchetti, a leading space law expert, has called for the development of a
legal regime that can protect the environment through reviewing and even
interrupting activity that threatens the environment.142 Tronchetti has theorized
that this regime could be an instrument attached to the Moon Treaty, Outer Space
Treaty, or an independent legal instrument.143 Creating a liability system for
environmental protection of celestial bodies would also be consistent with the
Moon Treaty’s call for the establishment of an international regime governing the
Moon. The Moon Treaty does not state that the regime must be administrative in
nature. A judicially constructed liability regime may qualify under the treaty as a
sort of delegation of authority by the States Parties under Article 11 § 5 of the
Moon Treaty. The regime would need to address the Moon Treaty’s stated goals
of safe and rational management of lunar resources and equitable benefits to all
States Parties. Enabling standing for claims of harm to celestial bodies would allow
states to sue when another state or private actor has acted in a manner that is not
safe for the juridical person of the Moon. The use of a more common law
approach through the ICJ would be a unique solution but still has the potential to
satisfy many of Tronchetti’s criteria. Under the common law framework, judges
will alter and improve rules in order to create a regulatory system of liability.
Indeed, the pollution of outer space brings in several familiar situations that
may be addressable based on common law tort and property theories. When a
river is being polluted upstream, there is an expectation in tort law that someone
will be able to show an ex post injury downstream, providing a regulating effect
through the plaintiff’s claim. Alternatively, a governmental authority can step in
before an injury occurs and create an ex ante regulatory system.144 But both
avenues to liability and thus regulation are absent in outer space. There is no
governmental authority with the power to regulate or levy fines. The ex post
deterrent is also weaker as it will be hard for any individual or government to
demonstrate their present harm from extraterrestrial pollution or even the
certainty that potential future harm will impact them specifically. A plaintiff such
as Ecuador would struggle to show causation for an environmental damage
occurring on the other side of the Earth, and it would be even more difficult when
that distance is multiplied nearly twenty-fold to the surface of the Moon. Through
the lens of property law, the resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies are
common resource pools and thus threatened by the tragedy of the commons.145
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Without some rule protecting their usage, these resources will be exploited. But
again, judges would be hard pressed to find who could claim the resources in order
to preserve them, and thus the common law approach at first appears to fall short.
These common law principles begin to work again when environmental
personhood is introduced. Recognizing the juridical personhood of the Moon
would allow individual or organizational custodians to sue on behalf of the
damaged ecosystem. While it would be necessary for another nation to bring the
claim, such as Ecuador, the ICJ could grant a custodianship to an organization or
select group of individuals. This is consistent with the models pioneered in
India,146 New Zealand,147 and Colombia.148 The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space or the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs could serve this
role.
Grounding a decision in the tradition of the common law might be more
appealing to ICJ justices. Rather than be accused of implementing a relatively new
legal concept without international proof of concept and giving substantial power
to single state-plaintiffs, the common law method is a smaller leap forward in
judicial reasoning. The ICJ would be much closer to the customary international
law sources of precedent in national courts and could draw on deeper wells of
international precedent in the environmental and tort areas of law, demonstrated
by Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and the Russian-Canadian settlement.

4. Prospect of Success
The potential of the contentious case strategy can be evaluated on two
factors: the probability of securing a favorable judgment in the law and the ability
to secure the desired remedy. Monetary damages are likely the best remedy for a
claim of lunar environmental degradation. This form of penalization gives
polluters an economic choice between adopting precautions and paying for
remediation. Alternatively, an injunction would be too hard for the ICJ to enforce
given that a defendant might choose to ignore the decision, knowing the ICJ lacks
serious enforcement power. The contentious case strategy is weaker in its
likelihood of success but stronger in its ability to provide a substantive remedy.
The probability of securing a judgment is undermined by the fact that it
requires a plaintiff nation who is willing to finance the litigation, risk the
diplomatic consequences of suing a powerful spacefaring nation, and lose future
space industry revenue as a result of an anti-space industry reputation. Although
Ecuador or Bolivia might be willing to take this step given their constitutional
dedication to the environment and present lack of a space industry, the ICJ might
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be concerned about the legitimacy costs of adopting such a new concept. But,
grounding the decision as common law progress could mitigate this concern.
Given the history of damages awarded in recent international environmental
cases, the contentious case strategy provides a useful avenue to secure the desired
remedy. The compensation paid to Canada by Russia evidences that monetary
damages can be appropriate compensation for damage in space.149 Instead of
payment by the offending nation to the nation bringing the claim on behalf of a
celestial body, the damages could be redirected toward lunar conservation or the
funding of environmental impact research through COPUOS. Rather than require
the direct sharing of economic benefits, which many industrialized countries
found objectionable with the Moon Treaty, the contribution to lunar conservation
could present a more acceptable tribute to the common heritage of all mankind.
The relevant U.N. organs could manage an environmental conservation trust on
behalf of the Moon. This idea combines the only precedent under the Space
Liability Convention, the Russia-Canada settlement,150 with the recent precedent
of environmental rulings at the ICJ, including the Costa Rica-Nicaragua dispute.151
Directing the use of funds towards the appropriate destinations is consistent with
the Costa Rica-Nicaragua ruling. If the ICJ continues to move in the direction of
awarding damages for environmental claims, the prospect of using a contentious
case for resolution will grow.
During contentious cases, States Parties not represented in the composition
of the ICJ’s bench have the opportunity to appoint an ad hoc judge pursuant to
Article 31 of the Statute of the ICJ. Even if the court were to dismiss a case on
the merits and not discuss the element of standing through environmental
personhood, a judge appointed by the environmentalist nation bringing the claim
could issue a dissenting or concurring opinion. An opinion approvingly citing
environmental personhood would create kindling for future claims in the same
manner as Justice Douglas in Morton.

C. Seeking an Advisory Opinion
Alternatively, the ICJ could reach a similar conclusion without the use of a
contentious case through its capacity to issue advisory opinions. The advisory
opinion offers several benefits: it would not require a single nation to initiate the
process, it would avoid creating an immediate loser, and it would offer an
opportunity to create a legal regime without limiting the ICJ to a presented set of
facts. Advisory opinions are not binding, but the requesting agency or organ can
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adopt the opinion to make it international law.152 Additionally, advisory opinions
carry the weight of the international court and can influence subsequent behavior
for actors wishing to avoid a detrimental contentious case.

1. Requesting an Advisory Opinion
Article 96 of the U.N. Charter says that “[t]he General Assembly or the
Security Council may request the [ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question.”153 Further, “[o]ther organs of the United Nations and specialized
agencies which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may
also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the
scope of their activities.”154 Previous U.N. agencies that have received advisory
opinions include the World Health Organization155 and the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, now the International Maritime
Organization.156
The most relevant part of the U.N., COPUOS, would likely be an entity
capable of asking for an advisory opinion as it operates as a subcommittee of the
General Assembly. In order to bring a claim, members of the committee would
need to pass a resolution asking the ICJ to clarify whether the term “juridical
person” from Article I of the Space Liability Convention extends to
environmental persons.157 Alternatively, an agency could request an advisory
opinion on the same question. There are currently 17 U.N. specialized agencies,158
with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the U.N. Industrial
Development Organization being the specialized agencies best positioned to
request an advisory opinion given their normal areas of expertise. The most
germane U.N. organ to request an advisory opinion would be UNOOSA, because
of its outer space expertise, but it is below the specialized agency status and
therefore lacks standing to request an advisory opinion. Generally, agencies might
be the more likely to act, since committees can be paralyzed by protesting nations
profiting from space exploitation.
The opinion would ideally come from an agency first requesting clarification
as to whether the term “juridical person” in the various treaties could be
interpreted as including environmental persons. The most important treaty for
152
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this part of the advisory opinion might be the Space Liability Treaty as it would
then give rise to claims for damages. The next part of a request for an advisory
opinion would seek to understand who can bring suit on behalf of juridical
persons within the ICJ. While the ordinary answer might be based on the
nationality of the juridical person, the space treaties would already prohibit the
celestial bodies as being considered part of any country. The ICJ may recognize
that any state party to the Outer Space or Space Liability treaties would have
standing to bring a claim against a violator. It is possible that the ICJ would
recognize the ability of natural persons to also bring suits on behalf of
environmental persons under the idea of “common heritage” similar to the New
Zealand example discussed previously, but this seems unlikely as the ICJ would
probably caution against a deluge of claims from individuals. Beyond states
parties, the next best plaintiffs would likely be the U.N. agencies themselves.

2. Advantages and Relative Value of an Advisory Opinion
In the context of an advisory opinion, the ICJ might be more willing to take
a bigger leap in protecting the environmental futures of celestial bodies. The ICJ
would be less afraid of losing legitimacy or seeing the immediate withdrawal of
nations from its jurisdiction. Furthermore, issuing an advisory opinion is an
inherently prospective exercise; it does not require adjudication between states
parties and therefore avoids the potentially undesirable optics of creating an
immediate loser in an area of previous legal uncertainty.
In comparison to a favorable contentious case opinion, securing a favorable
advisory opinion is less valuable. The advisory opinion is not binding on specific
parties and fails to deliver the precedent of monetary damages for extraterrestrial
environmental damage. Partially redeeming the value of the advisory opinion is
the limitation of the risk for the ICJ, with fewer political consequences for
generating a potentially controversial ruling. Weighing the comparative benefits
and risks, the contentious case likely offers the better strategy for
environmentalists to attract significant international attention to the problem and
potentially secure a remedy.

D. Shortcomings
Implementing environmental personhood for celestial bodies would be a
substantial step forward for the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Ordering substantial
damages or administrative action would likely stretch the boundaries of the court’s
power. A stronger ICJ may be necessary as the world becomes more connected
and some authority over space becomes essential to avoiding international
conflict. In the absence of the international committee envisioned by the Moon
Treaty, the ICJ may not be a perfect solution, but it might be one of the only
available solutions at present. This Section will discuss several of the difficulties
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associated with the proposed solution: national opposition, limits on institutional
capacity, and alternative interpretation of the outer space treaties.

1. National Opposition
Nations are clearly interested in promoting the development of their space
industries to grow their economies and acquire early dominance. The U.S. has
repeatedly introduced legislation to economically incentivize the development of
its space industry159 and has recognized the potential growth limiting factors of
cooperating with the international regime.160 A critical flaw of the plan is the
potential refusal or reluctance of the U.S. to comply with decisions of the ICJ.
After the ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua in Nicaragua v. United States,161 the
U.S. refused to pay damages. The U.S. protested the court’s jurisdiction despite
decades of previous compliance.162 While the U.N. Security Council has the power
to enforce judgments of the court, the U.S. is a permanent member with veto
power, a status it used repeatedly against attempts to collect reparations. The
undetermined level of compliance by the U.S., particularly given its withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement,163 may undercut the effectiveness of an ICJ judgment
in favor of protecting celestial bodies. One commenter noted that an international
regime regulating space would “be meaningless unless the U.S., the 800-pound
gorilla in space, agrees to go along with the results.”164 Major commercial actors
based in the U.S., such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, would be more shielded from
a judgment, although the overall industry may be more global in nature. However,
the language of the Outer Space Treaty, to which the U.S. is a party, does obligate
it to cooperate in the international law of outer space. To the extent that the ICJ
can dictate what the law is through advisory opinions and contentious holdings,
the U.S. would be bound to it, at least in principle.

2. Institutional Capacity
Currently, there are a limited number of spacecraft and the focus of
commercial spaceflight is on low Earth orbit, so it is conceivable to employ the
159
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ICJ and state plaintiffs to establish an early common law system for governing
outer space environmental liability. More space traffic is undoubtedly coming as
outlined in prior sections, which may call into question the efficacy of using a
litigation-based regime. Hoping for environmentally virtuous nations to bring
claims requires that they track the movements of potentially thousands of
spaceflights and mining activities and then fund their claims at the ICJ. Even
asking for a U.N. body to perform a regulatory capacity of this magnitude could
quickly strain the resources of the U.N.
One possible remedy is to implement a regime of plaintiff’s attorney fees for
bringing a successful claim on behalf of the environment to incentivize nations or
organizations with standing to bring good claims. Attorney fees are common in
international commercial arbitration,165 although importing standards from
commercial arbitration could seem initially discomforting within the context of
the ICJ. Such a proposal might seem unappealing in more controversial contexts
such as war claims but could be acceptable in a specialized tribunal for space
claims.
Turning from international arbitration to the custom in domestic legal
systems, the English rule of loser pays is nearly universal outside the U.S.166 The
ICJ or another adjudicating entity could adopt loser-pays fees as customary
international law, but this might also disincentivize plaintiffs fearful of footing a
legal bill for a lost claim in an uncertain field of law.
There would be significant complications for a “polluter pays” liability
regime as it is hard to track debris and other contaminants to the particular space
craft depositing them.167 Further, the cost of pollution is difficult to calculate and
the resulting damages might exceed any economic benefit from space activity,
chilling adoption since an absolute prohibition is incompatible with human
need.168 Determining the cost of pollution might require a determination about
what has been taken from the commons entitled to all mankind or what cultural
diminishment comes from altering a faraway surface.

3. Interpreting the Treaties’ Gaps as Enabling Mining
A final issue would be a defensive claim that mining the Moon is legal under
international law. The language of the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaties can
be construed as allowing the extraction of resources from celestial bodies. While
lunar resources cannot be claimed as property while still in the Moon, it could be
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argued that extracted resources are claimable.169 A ruling by the ICJ in favor of a
defending extractor might occur under this interpretation, but it would not
foreclose arguments based on contamination.
While it is conceivable that the text of the treaties could be used to enable
private property, it requires creative and generous interpretation of the U.N.
treaties to find sufficient loopholes. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states
that “[o]uter space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means.”170 This language, echoed in subsequent treaties, strongly
places the Moon in an extraterritorial category and potentially precludes property
rights over natural objects in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty also requires
states parties to ensure their citizens comply with the treaty, prohibiting private
property by extension. Arguments that the treaty only bans sovereign territorial
claims and not individual property claims fail on this point.171 Attempts by private
citizens to prospectively claim asteroids have been rejected by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which held that an individual could not charge NASA
for parking fees for landing on an asteroid he claimed to own.172 The district court
had held that the fact that the U.S. was not a party to the more stringent Moon
Treaty was not important; the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that either statement
establishes legal basis for his claim of a private property right on an asteroid.”173
In practice, the U.S. and other spacefaring nations have taken possession of
samples from outer space bodies, representing a form of property for national
governments. Unlike the proposed large-scale mining operations, the samples
taken by national space agencies thus far are relatively small amounts of material
taken for scientific purposes with strict cross-contamination prevention protocols.
Extraterrestrial sample collecting runs parallel with the scientific presence in
Antarctica, pursuing scientific goals to benefit all with the resources belonging to
the “common heritage of mankind.” Private exploitation and profit-seeking
colonization does not fit within the spirit or straightforward reading of the U.N.
space treaties.
Even if the ICJ or another body were to clearly state that the current outer
space regime enables private property rights in what is meant to be an
extraterritorial zone, the environmental personhood argument remains valid.
Rather than deny the existence of private property rights in outer space, the
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juridical personhood of the Moon would enforce a common property right to
lunar resources. Bringing claims on behalf of the Moon would vindicate these
rights and collect damages for restoration or conservation efforts equal to what
the individual infringer has taken from the commons. Private actors would retain
rights to technology developed on the Moon, but any contamination caused by
research would be grounds for a judgment for restoration of the natural state of
the lunar environment.

E. Alternative Solutions
1. Establishing a Moon Authority
Many of the issues discussed in this paper, as well as other outer space legal
problems, could be solved by the establishment of a lunar authority. 174 Such an
authority could oversee permitting, conservation, and contamination prevention
protocols. This authority is authorized by the Article 11 of the Moon Treaty, but
the Moon Treaty’s limited adoption is perhaps prohibitive of the creation of the
organization. Any effort to organize an International Moon Authority would need
to address the concerns that prevented the adoption of the Moon Treaty, namely
the tension between nations with the capability to exploit celestial resources and
those nations still developing space technology.175 Utilizing the ICJ and
environmental personhood may be preferable to establishing an administrative
agency charged with the protection of celestial bodies. When the potential gains
are trillions of dollars, the threat of regulatory capture of any administrative
organization is grave.176 It is possible that the administrative body could become
used not to conserve the Moon but to conserve the opportunities for exploitation
of celestial bodies for those actors with the necessary resources and influence.

2. Permanent Court of Arbitration
An often-discussed alternative to ICJ dispute resolution is the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA). Unlike the ICJ, the PCA can hear claims by private
parties, eliminating the need for a state to agree to bring a claim in the ICJ.177 If a
claim were first brought in the PCA, it is less likely that the PCA would seek to
progress international law and generate standing. The PCA also has fewer member
states and lacks any form of compulsory jurisdiction. As a result, it would be better
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for a claim to first come in the ICJ, establish standing, and then allow parties to
look to the PCA as a future alternative mechanism.

V. C ONCLUSION
Even if a requested advisory opinion was not sufficiently clear on the issue
of standing or a contentious claim failed on the merits, the act of bringing such a
claim could lead to action within the international community. Faced with the
possibility of liability for their extraterrestrial exploits, nations and private actors
may begin to independently craft their own legal regime. While law enacted with
the defendants might not be as appealing as a judicially crafted form of
environmental justice, the discussion around a regulatory or legislative framework
would at least bring attention to the risks already present. The U.S. and other
nations may become more comfortable with the Moon Treaty if the alternative is
a less predictable form of ICJ decision.
More broadly, outer space presents a carte blanche to explore a new way of
considering humanity’s relationship with nature. On Earth, we are tethered to
tradition and fear the costs of moving away from the known principles of standing
and torts. Yet, just as a pair of daring nations reached for the stars, now a few bold
nations are reconsidering what it means to exist with nature. Embracing
environmental personhood offers humanity an opportunity to test the legal
concept as a way to preserve the environment and imagine a new way of coexisting
with nature, rather than destroying it.
While the dividends of protecting celestial bodies may not be appreciated by
extraterrestrial human inhabitants for generations, there is a potential collateral
benefit to the adoption of environmental personhood of the Moon. It is possible
that a ruling by the ICJ in favor for environmental personhood spawns a reflective
impact on the international community of Earth. Nations may view
environmental personhood as a new international norm to which they should
conform. Alternatively, the success of an outer space regime for environmental
regulation could provide a roadmap for the establishment of systems to combat
climate change on Earth. The Paris Agreement sought to take an untested leap
forward, but perhaps an experiment in space will provide an example of
international environmental cooperation that can be replicated at home.
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